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“Arising Under” Jurisdiction in the Federalism
Renaissance: Verizon Maryland Inc. v. Public Service
Commission of Maryland1
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, the Republican Congress and the
Rehnquist Court have combined to restore the constitutional
understanding and stature of federalism. From the Court contracting
federal jurisdiction to the Congress expanding the use of state
regulatory agencies to federal schemes, it seems that both institutions
have sought to fuse the formerly split “atom of sovereignty”:2 states
have ever increasing power and autonomy in the federalism
renaissance.
To protect both state and federal sovereignty, Congress has
increasingly relied on a novel scheme in which the primary regulating
law is federal, but state agencies are charged with its interpretation
and implementation.3 Thus, state sovereignty is protected, but
federal standards are implemented. Such schemes have resulted from
years of negotiation and serious compromise between the

1. While this Note was in the final stages of publication, the Supreme Court issued its
decision in Verizon Maryland v. Public Service Commission of Maryland, 122 S. Ct. 1753
(2002). Consistent with the policy articulated in this Note, the Supreme Court found that the
federal district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
2. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“Federalism was our Nation’s own discovery. The Framers split the atom of
sovereignty.”).
3. For years, Congress has been innovative in its attempt to allocate power between
state and federal government. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Regulation, Deregulation,
Federalism, and Administrative Law: Agency Power to Preempt State Regulation, 46 U. PITT. L.
REV. 607, 643 (1985) (“Congress is not limited to a choice between allocating all power to
regulate an area of conduct to state or federal agencies. It can combine federal and state
regulatory power through any form of cooperative or creative federalism it finds appropriate to
a particular field of regulation.”). One scholar concisely detailed four benefits of cooperative
federalism schemes:
Traditionally, cooperative federalism programs have four basic purposes. First, they
respect long-standing state interests and autonomy. Second, they facilitate local
participation and greater accountability. Third, they allow for local experimentation
and interstate competition where appropriate. Finally, they rely on the economy of
local agencies (rather than creating or expanding a new national bureaucracy).
Philip J. Weiser, Chevron, Cooperative Federalism, and Telecommunications Reform, 52 VAND.
L. REV. 1, 31 (1999).
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Republicans and the Democrats. Nevertheless, the question remains
whether states will ever be federally accountable under such
cooperative federalism schemes.
The Telecommunications Act of 19964 (“the Telecom Act” or
“the Act”) represents one such scheme, radically changing the
telecommunications market by advancing local telecommunication
market competition.5 Therein, Congress provided a federal
regulatory scheme that would be implemented and interpreted by
state public utility commissions.6 However, the stakes regarding
opening up the telecommunications market are high and are
therefore fiercely litigated. Despite the fierce litigation, several critical
questions remain unanswered: Do federal district courts have
jurisdiction under the Act to review state public utility commission
decisions? If not, do federal district courts have jurisdiction under
the general grant of federal question jurisdiction found in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331? If jurisdiction exists, is a state public utility commission
immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment?7 If the
4. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C.) (“the Telecom Act” or “the Act”).
5. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-458, at 113 (1996).
6. 47 U.S.C. §§ 251–252 (Supp. 1999).
7. In a parallel dispute, Mathias v. WorldCom Technologies, Inc., 179 F.3d 566 (7th
Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 532 U.S. 903 (2001), the court focuses on the critical question of
whether states waive their sovereign immunity when the state regulatory commissions
voluntarily agree to regulate local telecommunications under the 1996 Act.
However, the question of sovereign immunity may only be adjudicated once the federal
court determines the question of jurisdiction. Just because the sovereign immunity question is
litigated second does not diminish its importance: sovereign immunity is a controversial and
significant issue. The Eleventh Amendment immunizes states from suits in federal court: “The
Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit . . . against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706 (1999), extends this immunization to suits against states in state courts based on
a federal law cause of action.
Theorists have interpreted the Eleventh Amendment both broadly and narrowly.
Narrow interpretivists argue that the language of the Eleventh Amendment is directed at the
diversity clause of Article III, Section 2, which provides for federal review of “Controversies …
between a State and Citizens of another State,” as opposed to the federal question clause of
Article III, Section 2, which provides for federal review of “Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority.”
In spite of its limited language, the Supreme Court has expansively interpreted the
protection of the Eleventh Amendment by viewing it as an affirmative, constitutional limitation
on the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts for suits against the states. The Court
explains: “Although the text of the Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article III
diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, ‘we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to
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commission is immune, may individual state public utility
commissioners be sued for prospective injunctive relief for continued
violations of federal law under the Ex parte Young doctrine?8
The federal circuits are deeply splintered on nearly all issues. In
Verizon Maryland Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland, the
Fourth Circuit found that the federal district court did not have

stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms.’”
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (quoting Blatchford v. Native Vill.
of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)).
States may waive their federal immunity and therefore be subject to suit. Indeed, “if a
State waives its immunity and consents to suit in federal court, the Eleventh Amendment does
not bar the action.” Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985).
However, the notion of constructive waiver—that states can waive sovereign immunity
without explicitly indicating this waiver—was eliminated by College Savings Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666, 684 (1999). States waive
immunity “‘only where stated by the most express language or by such overwhelming
implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.’” Id.
at 678 (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974)). Voluntarily accepting federal
funds does not inherently constitute a waiver: the “mere fact that a State participates in a
program through which the Federal Government provides assistance for the operation by the
State of a system of public aid is not sufficient to establish consent on the part of the State to
be sued in the federal courts.” Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673.
8. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The primary means by which federal rights are enforced in
face of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity challenges is Ex parte Young. Under this
doctrine, state officers may be sued for prospective injunctive relief where there is a continuing
violation of federal law. In Ex parte Young, the Court held that when state officers violate the
Constitution or federal laws, their illegal acts are stripped of state authority. The Court
explained:
The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional; and if it be so, the use of
the name of the state to enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury of
complainants is a proceeding without the authority of, and one which does not
affect, the state in its sovereign or governmental capacity. . . . he is in that case
stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to
the consequences of his individual conduct.
Id. at 159–60.
The Court has carved out three exceptions to the Ex parte Young doctrine: pendent
state law claims, federal statutes detailing a comprehensive enforcement mechanism, and cases
involving essential sovereign concerns, such as quiet title actions. The Mathias case hinged on
whether the Telecommunications Act of 1996 provided a comprehensive enforcement
mechanism or whether subjecting state officers to suit would jeopardize an essential state
concern.
For a broad overview of the implications of sovereign immunity and the Ex parte Young
doctrine, see Jake C. Blavat, Wisconsin Bell v. Public Service Commission of Wisconsin:
Problems in the Telecommunications Act in the New Age of Sovereign Immunity, 2000 WIS. L.
REV. 1149; Recent Cases, Constitutional Law—State Sovereignty—Seventh Circuit Holds that
States Waive Sovereign Immunity by Arbitrating Interconnection Agreements Under the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 114 HARV. L. REV . 1819 (2001).

719

REED-FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

9/30/2002 9:33 AM

[2002

jurisdiction under subsection 252(e)(6) of the Act,9 that Maryland
had not waived its sovereign immunity by participating in an
arbitration scheme devised by the 1996 Telecommunications Act,10
and that the plaintiff telecommunication carriers may not sue state
utility commissioners for prospective injunctive relief against
continuing violations of federal law.11 The Fourth Circuit’s
jurisdiction determination contrasts with that of the First, Fifth,
Sixth, and Seventh Circuits.12 The Fourth Circuit’s sovereign
immunity decision accords with the Sixth Circuit13 but contrasts with
the Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits.14 Nevertheless, the
courts are almost unanimous in finding that the Ex parte Young
doctrine should allow continued suit against state utility
commissioners.15
9. Bell Atl. Md., Inc. v. MCI WorldCom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279 (4th Cir. 2001)
(jurisdiction improper under both § 252(e)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
10. Id. at 309.
11. Id. at 298.
12. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 208 F.3d 475, 479–81 (5th Cir.
2000) (jurisdiction proper under § 252(e)(6)); see also Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. WorldCom Techs.,
Inc., 179 F.3d 566, 570–71 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 1224 (March 5, 2001);
P.R. Tel. Co. v. Telecomms. Regulatory Bd. of P.R., 189 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1999)
(assuming, without deciding, that the state commission interpretations and enforcements of
agreements are subject to federal court review under subsection 252(e)(6)); GTE N., Inc. v.
Strand, 209 F.3d 909, 919 (6th Cir. 2000) (jurisdiction proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
13. Bell Atl. Md., Inc., 240 F.3d at 289–90; Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. Climax Tel. Co., 202
F.3d 862, 867 n.2 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e do not base our decision on the reasoning in that
case because the court reached its decision by applying the constructive waiver doctrine, which
has since been limited by the Supreme Court in College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., [527 U.S. 666 (1999)] . . . .”).
14. AT&T Communications v. Bellsouth Telecomms. Inc., 238 F.3d 636, 647 (5th Cir.
2001) (“[T]he [state utility commission] voluntarily waived its state immunity when it
accepted the Congressional offer of a gratuity and arbitrated the interconnection dispute in this
case.”); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Utah, 216 F.3d 929 (10th Cir.
2000); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Nos. 00-2257, 00-2258, 2001
WL 1381590, at *16 (3d Cir. Nov. 2, 2001); Ill. Bell, 179 F.3d at 570 (citing MCI
Telecomms. Corp. v. Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 168 F.3d 315 (7th Cir. 1999), aff’d on reh’g,
222 F.3d 323 (7th Cir. 2000)).
15. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 202 F.3d at 867 (“[T]he case before this court is a
straightforward Ex parte Young case.”); Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Utah, 216 F.3d at 939 (“[T]he
instant suit is also a straightforward Ex parte Young case.”); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Ill. Bell
Tel. Co., 222 F.3d 323, 345 (7th Cir. 2000) (“these suits are ‘straightforward’ Ex parte Young
cases”); AT&T Communications, 238 F.3d at 647 (“[A] suit such as this one . . . is a ‘straight
forward’ Ex parte Young case.”); Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, 2001 WL 1281590, at *16; Ill.
Bell, 179 F.3d at 571. But see Bell Atl. Md., Inc., 240 F.3d at 298 (“[I]n the specific
circumstances of this case, we conclude that Ex parte Young does not authorize suit against the
individual members of the Maryland Public Service Commission.”).
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Given the split in the circuits, the Supreme Court granted a writ
of certiorari for the Seventh Circuit decision in Mathias v. Worldcom
Technologies, Inc.16 and for the Fourth Circuit decision in Verizon
Maryland Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland,17 certifying
the following questions:
Whether a state commission’s action relating to the enforcement of
a previously approved section 252 interconnection agreement is a
“determination under section 252” and thus is reviewable in
federal court under 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6).18
Whether a federal district court has subject-matter jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to determine whether a state public utility
commission’s order interpreting or enforcing an interconnection
agreement violates the Telecommunications Act of 1996.19
Whether a state commission’s acceptance of Congress’ invitation to
participate in implementing a federal regulatory scheme that
provides that state commission determinations are reviewable in
federal court constitutes a waiver of Eleventh Amendment
immunity.20
Whether an official capacity action seeking prospective relief against
state public utility commissioners for alleged ongoing violations of
federal law in performing federal regulatory functions under the
federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 can be maintained under
the Ex parte Young doctrine. 21

This Note addresses the question of whether the Telecom Act
provides independent federal question jurisdiction under § 1331.
This Note finds that under the Rehnquist Court’s interpretation of
16. 532 U.S. 903 (2001). The change of the case name reflects the change in
composition of the Illinois Commerce Commission. Richard L. Mathias, the named petitioner,
was and currently is an Illinois Public Utility Commissioner at the time of the appeal from the
Seventh Circuit.
17. 533 U.S. 928 (2001). The Court consolidated the Verizon case with United States v.
Public Service Commission of Maryland, which was also granted cert. Id.
18. Mathias, 532 U.S. at 903.
19. Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Virginia State Corporation Commission at 2, Verizon
Md. Inc., 122 S. Ct. 1753 (2002), (Nos. 00-1531, 00-1711); see also Verizon Md. Inc., v.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 533 U.S. 928 (2001).
20. Mathias, 532 U.S. at 903.
21. Id. The Supreme Court granted the motion of the United States to intervene with
the respondents. Mathias v. WorldCom Techs., Inc., 533 U.S. 968 (2001).
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federal court jurisdiction, the Court will likely find that federal courts
have subject matter jurisdiction over the case. This Note contends
that this result is critical because continued restriction of federal
court jurisdiction as a structural enhancement of federalism will
erode federal law uniformity absent adequate protections by state
courts.
Part II of this Note reviews the purposes of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the congressionally
contemplated role of the state utility commissions. Part III
introduces the procedural posture in the Fourth Circuit
consideration of Verizon Maryland Inc. v. Public Service Commission
of Maryland and sets forth the court’s argument for lack of § 1331
jurisdiction. Part IV analyzes the Rehnquist Court’s federal question
jurisprudence and the likely impact of restricting federal court power.
II. BACKGROUND: THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996
The Telecommunications Act of 199622 dramatically altered
telecommunications by disbanding local monopolies and making
competition economically feasible.23 Under the prior regime, the
Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) regulated interstate,
long-distance telecommunications while state public utility
commissions regulated intrastate, local telecommunications.24 Local
service acted as a natural monopoly and was so regulated by the state
commissions.25
The Telecom Act overhauled this system by creating competition
procedures,26 including the requirement that local carriers enter into
agreements with competitors to allow interconnection and access to
the local network (i.e., competitors may use the local network to
compete with the local carriers). The Act mandates that incumbent

22. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
23. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-458, at 113 (1996).
24. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a)–(b) (2002); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366,
403–04 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting).
25. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 371.
26. Three primary requirements are imposed on telecommunications carriers: (1)
competitors may “interconnect” their networks with the local’s existing network and do so at
rates, terms, and conditions that are “just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory”; (2) competitors
may lease local network elements at rates, terms, and conditions that are “just, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory”; and (3) competitors may buy local retail services at “wholesale rates.” 47
U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)–(4).
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local exchange carriers (“incumbents”) share their networks with
competitors. Reciprocal compensation agreements are an example of
a competitive arrangement required by the Act—this agreement
mandates that the carrier whose customer originates a telephone call
compensates the carrier whose facilities are used to complete the
call.27
Section 252 of the Act codifies the framework by which
incumbents and competitors negotiate interconnection agreements.
There are three primary steps: (1) incumbents and competitors
engage in good faith negotiation;28 (2) if unsuccessful, either party
may request mandatory arbitration by the state commission or,
should the commission fail to act, by the FCC;29 (3) if unsatisfied
with the commission’s findings, any “aggrieved” party may seek
review of the agreement in federal court for compliance with the Act.
Section 252(e)(6) provides:
In any case in which a State commission makes a determination
under this section, any party aggrieved by such determination may
bring an action in an appropriate Federal district court to
determine whether the agreement or statement meets the
requirements of section 251 and this section.

The Telecom Act strips state courts of jurisdiction to review a
state commission’s decision to approve or reject an agreement.30
III. THE CASE BELOW: VERIZON MARYLAND INC. V. PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND
Acting pursuant to its regulatory authority, the Public Service
Commission of Maryland (“MPSC”) approved negotiated
interconnection agreements between the local incumbent, Bell
Atlantic (predecessor to Verizon Communications, Inc.), and MCI
27. Id. § 252(b)(5).
28. Id. § 252. Negotiated agreements must be approved by the state utility commission
and only may be approved if they comply with the Act and FCC regulations, do not
“discriminate[] against a telecommunications carrier not a party to the agreement,” and are
“consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity.” Id. § 252(e)(2)(A).
29. Id. § 252(b). Notably, no state has yet abdicated regulatory authority to the FCC.
Were the FCC to ct as regulatory under the Act, the FCC proceeding and “any judicial review
of the [FCC’s] actions [would] be exclusive remedies for a State commission’s failure to act.”
Id. § 252(e)(6). All FCC final orders are reviewable in the federal courts of appeals. Hobbs
Administrative Orders Review Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341–2352 (2000).
30. 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(4).
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Worldcom and other prospective competitors. The agreement
between Bell Atlantic and its competitors provided for the payment
of reciprocal compensation for local calls, as required by both the Act
and FCC regulations.31 An dispute then ensued between the parties
regarding whether the agreement required reciprocal compensation
for customers’ calls to Internet service providers (“ISPs”) to access
the Internet.32 The MPSC determined that calls to ISPs were local
and ordered payment of reciprocal compensation. The FCC then
ruled that ISP calls were not local, but that the state commissions
could individually interpret contracts to provide otherwise.33 Bell
Atlantic again sought review by the MPSC, which once more
determined that the ISP calls were local.
Bell Atlantic then sought review of the decision in federal district
court and named the MPSC, MPSC commissioners in their official
capacities, and competitors as defendants, invoking jurisdiction
under 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (the statute in
which Congress provides federal courts with subject matter
jurisdiction over disputes “arising under” federal law). Bell Atlantic
argued that the decision was contrary to federal law in that it violated
an FCC ruling34 and the Telecom Act itself. The MPSC and
31. Id. § 251(b)(5); Reciprocal Compensation for Transport and Termination of
Telecommunications Traffic, 47 C.F.R. § 51.701(a) (2001).
32. In the traditional situation, local calls requiring reciprocal compensation are easily
identified. However, calls to ISPs require a modem to connect to an ISP, and the ISP then
connects to the selected website anywhere in the world (a connection that is indisputably long
distance). Because this connection is unbroken, some telecommunication companies argue that
the call is not local and therefore does not mandate reciprocal compensation. See, e.g., Brief for
Petitioner Verizon Maryland Inc., Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 122 S. Ct.
1753 (2002) (Nos. 00-1531, 00-1711).
33. Declaratory Ruling, In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 14 F.C.C.R. 3689 (1999), vacated by Bell Atl. Tel. Co.
v. FCC, 206 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
34. First Report and Order, In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions
in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499 (1996) (subsequent history
omitted); see also Order on Remand and Report and Order, Implementation of the Local
Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 16 F.C.C.R. 9151, 2001 WL
455869, at *36–37 (rel. Apr. 27, 2001) (finding that the reciprocal compensation scheme
does not apply to “access services or services associated with access”), petitions for review
pending, No. 01-1218 (D.C. Cir.). The FCC argued that state regulatory determinations that
ISP calls are local and require reciprocal compensation has undermined the goals of the 1996
Act and “led to classic regulatory arbitrage,” creating a “windfall” for LECs, “distort[ing] the
development of competitive markets.” Id. at 21, 29, 70; see also Declaratory Ruling,
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
14 F.C.C.R 3689 (1999), vacated by Bell Atl. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 206 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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commissioners moved to dismiss, arguing immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment. The district court found that the Eleventh
Amendment barred the suit against the state, that the Ex parte
Young doctrine did not apply to the individual commissioners, and
that the action must therefore be dismissed because the MPSC was
an indispensable party under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule
19.35
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, adding that
federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review state
commission decisions enforcing or interpreting previously approved
interconnection agreements and that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
buttressed the finding of no jurisdiction.36 The court found that “in
the final analysis, the State commission determinations under § 252
involve only approval or rejection of such agreements” and found
that other determinations (such as enforcement or interpretation) are
“left for review as specified by State law.”37 The court then rejected §
1331 jurisdiction, explaining that “in light of the limited grant of
federal jurisdiction in 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6), the exercise of § 1331
general federal question jurisdiction would ‘flout, or at least
undermine, congressional intent.’”38
IV. THE FEDERALIST TRADE-OFF: STATE SOVEREIGNTY OR
FEDERAL ACCOUNTABILITY
The stature of federalism has increased greatly in the Rehnquist
Court. A series of decisions have increased state sovereignty by
substantively limiting the scope of congressional legislation in
traditional areas of state sovereignty.39 To do so, the Court relied

35. Bell Atl. Md., Inc. v. MCI WorldCom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279, 286–87 (4th Cir. 2001)
(summarizing the district court decision).
36. The court held that the doctrine that “lower federal courts are not authorized to
review final judgments from State court proceedings” should be extended to prohibit “in the
absence of specific federal authorization” federal court review of orders issued by a “state
quasi-judicial body, such as the Maryland Public Service Commission.” Bell Atl. Md., Inc., 240
F.3d at 308 & n.8; see also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
37. Bell Atl. Md., Inc., 240 F.3d at 301.
38. Id. at 307 (quoting Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 812
(1986)). Judge King dissented but did not reach the question of whether § 1331
independently grants jurisdiction. Id. at 309–19.
39. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (Congress may not
“commandeer” the states); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that the
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primarily on the structure or “spirit” of the Tenth Amendment.40
Not surprisingly, decisions that substantively limit the scope of
congressional power are controversial. Limiting the scope of federal
question jurisdiction—as the Fourth Circuit did in Verizon—is a
more potent, yet effective way to distribute power to the states.
This section addresses the question of whether limiting the scope
of federal court jurisdiction is consistent with Supreme Court
precedent and congressional policy under § 1331. I first review the
common law framework of federal question jurisdiction. Next, I
analyze the possible federal question in the Act, evaluating
federalized contracts, implied private rights of action, and federal
preemption under the Act. Finally, I examine four potential
limitations on federal question jurisdiction, concluding that the
Court will likely find federal preemption under the Act and likely
find that the FCC ruling supplies arising under jurisdiction.
A. Arising Under Jurisdiction Historically
“[I]n our federal system allocations of jurisdiction have been
carefully wrought to correspond to the realities of power and interest
and national policy.”41 Unfortunately, this judicial weighing game
has turned jurisdiction into a tangled web, with little predictability
for parties.42 The Constitution authorizes federal question
reserved power of the states cuts across all delegated congressional powers and that the Tenth
Amendment is textual evidence of the constitutional concern for federalism); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that Congress exceeded the scope of its commerce
clause authority in enacting the Gun-Free School Zones Act); United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down Violence Against Women Act as an intrusion into state police
powers and as an unconstitutional exercise of commerce power). All of the aforementioned
cases were decided by a 5-4 split, with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas in the majority and Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer in
the minority.
40. The Tenth Amendment provides, “The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528, 585 (1985) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“spirit” of the Tenth Amendment).
This dissenting approach to the spirit of the Tenth Amendment was subsequently adopted by a
majority of the Rehnquist court. See supra note 39.
41. Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 411 (1959) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
42. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION
BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 482 (1969) (“In determining which cases are federal
question cases, within the statutory grant of jurisdiction, there is a proliferation of theories, but
the case law cannot be rationalized by any one of them. The subject has spawned a voluminous
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jurisdiction in Article III, where it states that federal judicial power
“shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority . . . .”43 From the earliest
decisions, the constitutional grant of arising under jurisdiction has
been construed broadly, extending to all cases where federal issues
“form[] an ingredient of the original cause.”44
Section 1331, passed in the aftermath of the Civil War in 1875,
was symbolic of the dramatic restructuring of federal–state power
after the war. The language of the statutory federal question grant is
strikingly similar to that of Article III: “The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the . . . laws . . .
of the United States.”45 In spite of the linguistic similarity, statutory
federal question jurisdiction has always been construed much more
narrowly than the constitutional grant of federal question
jurisdiction.46 Yet the courts’ exercise of federal question jurisdiction
remains one of their most important functions. Federal courts serve
many policy ends, such as expert interpretation, sympathetic forum,
uniform interpretation of federal law, and impartiality provided by
the life and tenure provisions of Article III.47
The federal question jurisdiction statute provides subject matter
jurisdiction for two different situations: (1) where there is a federal
law cause of action (a position first articulated by Justice Holmes)48
or (2) where there is a state law cause of action that necessarily turns
on a substantial question of federal law.49 While the Holmes test

literature. . . .”); 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3562, at 17–18 (2d ed. 1984) (“The most difficult single problem in determining whether
federal question jurisdiction exists is deciding when the relation of federal law to a case is such
that the action may be said to be one ‘arising under’ that law.”); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 17, at 101 (5th ed. 1994) (“it cannot be said that any clear test
has yet been developed to determine which cases ‘arise under’”).
43. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
44. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824).
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
46. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 495 (1983) (“Article III
‘arising under’ jurisdiction is broader than federal question jurisdiction under § 1331.”).
47. See, e.g., Patti Alleva, Prerogative Lost: The Trouble with Statutory Federal Question
Doctrine After Merrell Dow, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1477, 1495–96 (1991).
48. See Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916).
49. Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 201 (1921).
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seems to equate jurisdiction with cause of action, jurisdiction is not
synonymous with cause of action.50 Professor Patti Alleva explains:
To automatically equate the legislature’s enforcement objectives
(i.e., whether a particular right or interest should be enforceable)
with its forum objectives (i.e., which forum may hear that
enforcement action) results in a blur of substantive and
jurisdictional concerns disrespectful of the court’s delegated
authority under the general federal question statute to determine
whether federal forum protections are warranted in particular cases
regardless of their cause of action labels.51

Thus, the court must first determine the cause of action and then
evaluate whether it has subject matter jurisdiction under the federal
question statute. This, however, does not mean that a right of action
that will likely fail will therefore not meet the jurisdictional
requirements of § 1331. “For purposes of determining whether
jurisdiction exists under § 1331(a) . . . , it is not necessary to decide
whether [the plaintiff’s] alleged cause of action . . . is in fact a cause
of action ‘on which [the plaintiff] could actually recover.’”52 Rather,
federal question jurisdiction requires analysis of whether the claim is
“so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this
Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a
federal controversy.”53
While federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, this does
not mean that federal courts’ jurisdiction must always be construed
narrowly. Indeed, “only upon a showing of ‘clear and convincing
evidence’ of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict
access to judicial review.”54

50. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 92 (1998) (finding that the
Court has never found the existence of a cause of action “jurisdictional” and deciding the case
before resolving a dispute concerning the existence of an Article III case or controversy).
51. Alleva, supra note 47, at 1509–10.
52. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 70 (1978)
(quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946)).
53. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974).
54. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967). Nevertheless, it is important
to note that due process is not implicated by determining jurisdiction in the instant case
because if federal question jurisdiction is denied, state court jurisdiction still exists to adjudicate
the claims. This is bolstered by Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), which provided that states
are obligated to enforce federal substantive provisions with the same force they would enforce
state substantive provisions.
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B. Uncovering the Federal Question in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996

The Telecom Act was passed with the general understanding that
if there was a dispute regarding federal policy, the federal courts
could compel compliance. Even the most thoughtful jurists did not
question federal jurisdiction under the Act. As Justice Scalia
observed, “there is no doubt . . . that if the federal courts believe a
state commission is not regulating in accordance with federal policy
they may bring it to heel.”55 Yet analysis of the Act leaves many still
scratching their heads, trying to determine where the federal
question lies in this critical area of federal regulation. At oral
argument, one justice reflected, “I’m really left at sea about what is
the federal question.”56
Three possible theories provide federal question jurisdiction in
the Telecom Act: federalized contracts law, implied private rights of
action, or state breach of contract action that necessarily depends on
an important FCC interpretation (i.e., federal preemption). Federal
preemption most likely supplies the best argument that federal courts
have subject matter jurisdiction over the Verizon dispute.
1. Federalized contracts law
In spite of federal common law’s ostensible death in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,57 federal common law may arguably form
the basis for federal jurisdiction under the Telecom Act. In many
instances where there is a strong federal interest, courts have found
that rights and obligations are determined by common law created
by the federal courts.58 Such adopted law may simply incorporate
55. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 378 n.6 (1999).
56. Oral Argument at 15, Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 122 S. Ct.
1753 (2002) (Nos. 00-1531, 00-1711).
57. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (The Court determined that “There is no federal general
common law.”).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979) (concluding
that the source of law for contractual liens arising from Small Business Administration loan is
federal but adopting state law as the appropriate federal law because there was no need for
federal uniformity); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1957)
(vesting authority in federal courts to create federal common law of labor-management
relations under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act). But see United States v.
Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966) (applying state law rather than devising a federal common law
standard where an individually negotiated contract is between private party and Small Business
Administration).
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state law and vary across the country or may be developed as federal
common law and be unified across federal courts of appeals.
Competitor telecommunications companies argue that because
agreement claims “depend on rights and obligations derived from
the parties’ interconnection agreement,” the “documents are federal
contracts that implement federal policy and embody federal
standards.”59 These contracts are federal for five primary reasons: (1)
federal law mandates the agreement; (2) parties must enter into
good-faith negotiations; (3) parties are subject to specific duties that
are subject to negotiation; (4) agreements must be publicly filed; and
(5) once entered into, parties have a federal duty to provide service
“in accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement.”60
These provisions of the Telecom Act are similar to § 204 of the
Railway Labor Act, in which disputes over the interpretation of a
mandatory labor-management agreement were determined to have
arising under jurisdiction because the contracts were considered
“federal contracts.”61 The Court found:
the statute and the federal law which must determine whether the
contractual arrangements made by the parties are sufficient to
discharge the mandate of § 204 and are consistent with the Act and
its purposes. It is federal law which would determine whether a §
204 contract is valid and enforceable according to its terms. If these
contracts are to serve this function under § 204, their validity,
interpretation, and enforceability cannot be left to the laws of the
many States, for it would be fatal to the goals of the Act if a
contractual provision contrary to the federal command were
nevertheless enforced under state law or if a contract were struck
down even though in furtherance of the federal scheme.62

Several schemes have previously been found to federalize seemingly
state-law contract agreements.63

59. Brief for Petitioner Verizon Maryland Inc. at 20, Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n of Md., 122 S. Ct. 1753 (2002) (Nos. 00-1531, 00-1711).
60. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)(D), (c)(3).
61. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Cent. Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682, 692, 695–96 (1963).
62. Id. at 691–92.
63. Norfolk & W. R.R. v. Nemitz, 404 U.S. 37 (1971) (dispute arising out of
agreement implementing obligations under the Interstate Commerce Act falls under § 1331);
Am. Sur. Co. v. Schultz, 237 U.S. 159 (1915) (appeal bond provided to satisfy requirements
of federal law raised federal question).
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Nevertheless, the reliance on federalized contract law theories
seems to ignore the historical differences between arising under
jurisdiction as defined by Article III, Section 2 and as defined
statutorily under § 1331. While the constitutional grant, as
interpreted by Osborn v. Bank of the United States,64 allows federal
jurisdiction wherever federal law is an “original ingredient” in the
case, the statutory grant requires more: either a specific or implied
federal statutory cause of action65 or a state cause of action that
necessarily turns on a substantial question of federal law.66 The mere
statutory requirement that a contract be formed is an “original
ingredient” and nothing more. The Act must provide some other
avenue under which the contract itself is federal, is subject to
substantive federal requirements or procedures, or provides a private
cause of action.
Bell
Atlantic
also
attempts
to
federalize
these
telecommunications contracts by analogizing the contracts to federal
tariffs. Bell Atlantic notes that the Telecom Act mandates that
incumbents negotiate interconnection agreements on demand,67
include in the agreements “a detailed schedule of itemized
charges,”68 file approved agreements with state regulatory
commissions for public inspection,69 offer service at the negotiated
terms,70 and offer the same arrangement (terms and conditions) to
all other telecommunication competitors.71 Similarly, in Thurston
Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd.,72 a common carrier sued
because a competitor had not paid all the charges required by the
Interstate Commerce Act.73 Although the lower court characterized
the charges as a “simple contract-collection action,”74 the Court
found that where the common carrier’s claim is “predicated on the
64. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
65. See Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916).
66. Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 201 (1921).
67. 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(c)(1), 252(a)(1); see also Brief for Petitioner Verizon Maryland
Inc. at 19–20, Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 122 S. Ct. 1753 (2002) (Nos.
00-1531, 00-1711).
68. Id. § 252(a)(1); see also Brief for Verizon Md. Inc., at 19–20.
69. Id. § 252(h); see also Brief for Verizon Md. Inc., at 19–20.
70. Id. § 251(c)(2)(D), (c)(3); see also Brief for Verizon Md. Inc., at 19–20.
71. Id. § 252(i); see also Brief for Verizon Md. Inc., at 19–20.
72. 460 U.S. 533 (1983).
73. Id. at 533.
74. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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tariff” that “the parties are held to the responsibilities imposed by
the federal law, to the exclusion of all other rules of obligation.’”75
The courts of appeals have generally employed the analogy between
telecommunication fees and federal tariffs in finding federal question
jurisdiction under § 203 of the Communications Act of 1934.76
State commissions rebut this argument by maintaining that these
tariffs resemble state tariffs as opposed to federal tariffs. They argue
that because the state public utility commissions broker these
agreements and fees, the fees are more like state tariffs. This
conclusion ignores one dispositive fact: the state regulatory
commissions are the agents of the federal government in the
Telecom Act. Although the state commission does determine the
rates, oversee the filing, and regulate many other aspects of the
interconnection agreements, it does so at the behest of the federal
government. The FCC has the power to adjudicate such agreements
if state utility commissioners choose not to regulate. It would be
entirely inconsistent to argue that the reciprocal compensation fees
would be state tariffs in those states that choose to regulate but
federal tariffs in those states that choose not to regulate. Such a
scenario would lead to a bifurcated scheme in which state regulatory
commissions could affirmatively deny federal review by simply opting
into the regulation scheme.

75. Id. at 535 (quoting Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Rice, 247 U.S. 201, 203
(1918)); see also Great N. Ry. Co. v. Merchs. Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 290 (1922) (“Every
question of the construction of a tariff is deemed a question of law; and where the question
concerns an interstate tariff it is one of federal law.”). Note that both Rice and Thurston Motor
Lines involved jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1337. However, for purposes of determining
whether a federal question exists, the statutes are substantially similar. See, e.g., ErieNet, Inc. v.
Velocity Net, Inc., 156 F.3d 513, 520 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[A]ny action that could be brought in
federal court under § 1337 could also be brought under § 1331.”).
76. Fax Telecommunicaciones Inc. v. AT&T, 138 F.3d 479, 482, 488 (2d Cir. 1998);
Cahnmann v. Sprint Corp., 133 F.3d 484, 488–89 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 952
(1998); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Teleconcepts, Inc., 71 F.3d 1086, 1093–96 (3d Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 815 (1996); W. Union Int’l, Inc. v. Data Dev., Inc., 41 F.3d
1494, 1496 (11th Cir. 1995); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Graham, 7 F.3d 477, 479–80 (6th
Cir. 1993); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Garden State Inv. Corp., 981 F.2d 385, 387–88 (8th
Cir. 1992); see also AT&T Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 222 (1998) (noting
that the Communication Act’s provisions “are modeled after similar provisions of the Interstate
Commerce Act . . . and share its goal of preventing unreasonable and discriminatory charges”).
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2. Implied private right of action
Barring complete federalization of contracts, the Court could
simply find an implied private cause of action for telecommunications
competitors under the Telecom Act. Determining whether there is a
private cause of action requires analyzing whether Congress intended
there to be a private right of action: courts presume that absent
express authorization, private causes of action do not exist.77 The
current approach dictated in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington78
provides that “[t]he source of plaintiffs’ rights must be found, if at
all, in the substantive provisions of the . . . Act which they seek to
enforce, not in the jurisdictional provision.”79 The touchstone of
implied private rights of action is now congressional intent. Indeed,
“the fact that a federal statute has been violated and some person
harmed does not automatically give rise to a private cause of action
in favor of that person.”80
In Cort v. Ash,81 the Court set forth four factors to determine
whether Congress intended to create a federal private right of action:
(1) Is the plaintiff a member of the class for whose benefit the statute
was enacted? (2) Does legislative intent—either explicit or implicit—
indicate intention to create a remedy? (3) Would such a private cause
of action be consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme? (4) “[I]s the cause of action one traditionally relegated to
state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it
would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on
federal law?”82

77. See, e.g., La. Landmarks Soc’y, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 85 F.3d 1119, 1123
(5th Cir. 1996). This presumption represents a change from historical framework in which
private causes of action were more liberally construed (i.e., the court would supply all
customary remedies necessary to effectuate the congressional purpose). See J. I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
78. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
79. Id. at 577.
80. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979).
81. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
82. Id. at 78. This approach is now criticized by some justices as being too expansive.
See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 189 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[W]e
effectively overruled the Cort v. Ash analysis in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington . . . converting
one of its four factors (congressional intent) into the determinative factor, with the other three
merely indicative of its presence or absence.” (citations omitted).).
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After years of negotiation and debate over the Act, considerable
legislative history exists, yet none clearly answers whether the Act
intended to allow private carriers to sue. The Act states its intent up
front: “To promote competition and reduce regulation in order to
secure lower prices and higher quality services for American
telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment
of new telecommunications technologies.”83 Congress affirmed this
in one of its numerous House reports by saying, “[t]he result will be
lower prices to consumers and businesses, . . . a competitive edge for
American businesses, . . . [i]ndeed, the enormous benefits to
American business and consumers from lifting the shackles of
monopoly regulation . . . .”84 The clearest beneficiary from this
statute is the American consumer. However, it is possible to argue
that Bell Atlantic, as a competitor to the Local Exchange Carrier, is
also a plaintiff that the statute intended to protect from the severe
disadvantage of monopolies.
Legislative history is similarly ambiguous as to whether Congress
intended review. Only one area of the Act provides for federal
jurisdiction—§ 252(e)(6), which itself limits federal jurisdiction to
review of a state commission’s approval or rejection of an
interconnection agreement. The Court has held that where Congress
expressly provides a particular method of enforcing a substantive
rule, Congress intends to preclude others.85 Thus, some (including
the MPSC) argue that this narrow provision for federal jurisdiction is
structural evidence that Congress intended only state review for all
other disputes. However, this argument does not fall squarely within
existing case law. With regards to interpretation of interconnection
agreements, Congress did not make any explicit or particular method
of enforcement. Thus, it appears that rather than having a particular
remedy that would limit jurisdiction, the Act simply remains silent.86
83. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
84. H.R. Rep. 104-204, at 48 (1996).
85. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 93–94, 97 (1981)
(“The presumption that a remedy was deliberately omitted from a statute is strongest when
Congress has enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme including an integrated system of
procedures for enforcement.”).
86. MPSC argues that this silence should be interpreted as intent to affirmatively deny
jurisdiction. MPSC makes a structural argument, comparing two other provisions (§§ 274 and
207) that explicitly provide private causes of actions. They note, “That Congress expressly
provided for a private cause of action in these sections is evidence that when Congress wished
to provide a private remedy, it knew how to do so and did so expressly.” Brief for Respondent
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Finally, intrastate telecommunications agreements have been
traditionally relegated to state law: state public utility commissions
were the exclusive regulators of local telecommunications until
passage of the Telecom Act. This suggests that the states’ already
extensive regulatory scheme was the backdrop for the new federal
requirements. All of these factors combine to suggest that Congress
did not intend for a private cause of action; therefore, giving due
consideration to separation of powers, the Court should not imply
one.
3. The Telecom Act, FCC interpretation, and federal preemption
Even if the interconnection agreements are determined to be
state law contracts, arising under jurisdiction may still exist under the
Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co. conception of arising under
jurisdiction: the state law cause of action (breach of contract)
necessarily depends on a substantial question of federal law87
(whether federal law mandates reciprocal payment for customer calls
to ISPs). Thus, the most probable federal question is the MPSC’s
determination that the calls to ISPs were local. If the Telecom Act
or the FCC ruling requires that calls to ISPs be treated as nonlocal,
then the MPSC’s finding that the calls be treated as local violates
federal law.88 Under the Supremacy Clause, the federal interpretation
must prevail.
The current uncertainties regarding the FCC’s position, given
that its ruling has been vacated by the D.C. Circuit, makes the
substantive question regarding the treatment of ISP calls unclear.
However, whether Bell Atlantic will actually prevail on the question
of reciprocal compensation is irrelevant to the determination of
whether federal courts have jurisdiction to review the complaint.89
These uncertainties may give rise to a federal court staying the
litigation until the substantive ruling is resolved, but the
uncertainties do not divest federal courts of jurisdiction. The
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides that federal law—
at 16, Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 122 S. Ct. 1753 (2002) (Nos. 001531, 00-1711). Moreover, Congress considered providing a private cause of action in § 257,
but ultimately the Act passed without such a provision. See S. RPT. NO. 104-23, at 104-05
(1995).
87. See supra note 49.
88. See cases cited supra note 34.
89. See supra notes 48–52.
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including the Act and the FCC ruling—prevail over conflicting state
law.90 To maintain this supremacy, federal courts must have the
opportunity to review whether a state commission’s decision
contravenes federal law.
C. Limitations on Arising Under Jurisdiction
Exceptions to the general rules of federal jurisdiction tangle the
web even further. Even where federal question jurisdiction ostensibly
exists, federal courts impose four limitations that would divest the
court of subject matter jurisdiction: (1) the Merrell Dow/implied
right of action exception; (2) the complicated bifurcated scheme
limitation; (3) the pragmatic “docket control” exemption; and (4)
the Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine. Each poses a significant
hurdle to complicated cooperative-federalist arrangements like the
Telecom Act.
1. Merrell Dow—Implied statutory cause of action
If Congress did not intend a private right of action, the Court
will likely find that Congress also did not intend for Smith-style
federal question jurisdiction and that expanding the scope of the
statutory jurisdictional grant would flout congressional intent. The
Merrell Dow Court held that “the congressional determination that
there should be no federal remedy for the violation of this federal
statute is tantamount to a congressional conclusion that the presence
of a claimed violation of the statute as an element of a state cause of
action is insufficiently ‘substantial’ to confer federal-question
jurisdiction.”91 The Fourth Circuit contended that because federal
review was specifically elucidated in § 252(e)(6), Congress did not
intend for broader § 1331 jurisdiction. However, Bell Atlantic rebuts
this by arguing that unlike Merrell Dow, where plaintiffs brought a
state-law claim for which the standard of care was based on a federal
statute, in the instant case “the rights to be protected are federal
rights, arising from federal contracts, to be construed in accordance
with federal law.”92 The Court, however, will likely find no federal
90. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2; see, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85,
96 n.14 (1983).
91. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814 (1986).
92. Brief for Petitioner Verizon Maryland Inc at 24 n.8, Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n of Md., 122 S. Ct. 1753 (2002) (Nos. 00-1531, 00-1711).
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contract;93 therefore, Merrell Dow may act to preclude federal
question jurisdiction.
2. Complicated, bifurcated jurisdictional scheme
Where a congressional statute creates a complicated jurisdictional
scheme, bifurcated between state and federal governments
depending on the situation, courts will construe the statute so as to
eliminate such complications. Thus, in the instant case, just because
federal law requires parties to enter into contracts does not mean
that federal law governs those contracts. In Jackson Transit, the
Court evaluated whether collective-bargaining agreements between
local governments and their employees were the subject of the
federal law.94 The Jackson Transit Court noted that “suits to enforce
contracts contemplated by federal statutes may set forth federal
claims and that private parties in appropriate cases may sue in federal
court to enforce contractual rights created by federal statutes.”95 The
Court evaluated whether Congress intended the contract rights and
obligations to be “federal in nature.”96 The Court found that
because these local collective-bargaining arrangements were creatures
of state (rather than federal) law and because the legislative history
“evinces no congressional intent to upset” the exemption of these
localities from federal regulation, these labor contracts were
considered state law contracts controlled by state law in state
courts.97
In Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co.,98 the
Court opted against a bifurcated scheme and allowed all cases arising
under the Expedited Funds Availability Act to fall under federal
question jurisdiction. Justice Ginsburg reasoned that “All . . . claims
arising out of the same transaction may be brought in a single
forum—either in federal court . . . or in state court.”99 She noted
that the alternative—forcing some adjudication to federal court and
others to state court—“would yield an incoherent jurisdictional
93. See supra Part IV.B.1.
94. Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local Div. 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union, 457 U.S.
15 (1982).
95. Id. at 22 (1982).
96. Id. at 23.
97. Id. at 23–24, 29.
98. 516 U.S. 264 (1996).
99. Id. at 275.
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scheme” that is “decidedly inefficient” and that the Court “would
hesitate to attribute . . . to Congress.”100
The jurisdictional scheme evolving from the Telecom Act
appears to be even more complicated than that of Bank One. The
question of sovereign immunity will make the system increasingly
complicated because some claims, although proper under
supplemental jurisdiction, may not be litigated in federal court.101
Jackson Transit most powerfully supports the contention that the
Telecom Act did not confer general federal question jurisdiction.
Telecom Act interconnection agreement disputes do not seem to
have a state law basis, just as in Jackson Transit. The Supreme Court
has even noted that Congress has “unquestionably . . . taken the
regulation of local telecommunications competition away from the
states.”102 However, the agreement between the telecommunications
parties voluntarily incorporated federal law, and such federal
standards were not mandatory. Because parties themselves cannot
invent arising under jurisdiction, the agreement itself likely did not
provide original jurisdiction for the district court.103
3. Docket control: A legitimate limiting factor?
Do simple contract disputes belong in federal court? Federal
courts are indisputably overburdened,104 but this may not inherently
justify denying jurisdiction. As Professor Martin Redish remarked,
“The federal government cannot shirk its responsibility to assure that
the federal courts perform their designated role any more than it can
ignore its other essential obligations.”105 Indeed, in the instances
100. Id. at 275–76. But see Bank One Chi., 516 U.S. at 279 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The
law is what the law says, and we should content ourselves with reading it rather than
psychoanalyzing those who enacted it.”).
101. Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts
from hearing pendent state law claims against state officers in federal court).
102. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 378 n.6 (1999).
103. It remains an open question whether an arbitrated agreement that incorporates
federal law creates a federal question.
104. See, e.g., FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE , REPORT ON THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND RELATION TO THE STATES 26–28 (1990) (reviewing the increased growth in
federal court caseload); see also JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U NITED STATES, LONG
RANGE P LAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 21–38, app. A (1995) (reviewing the current
structure of and recommendations for judicial federalism and detailing current trends and
projections of federal question caseload).
105. Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and
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where the Supreme Court has considered docket control, it “has
invariably been guilty of employing . . . the ‘astrological sign’
approach to docket control.”106
The Court continues its narrowed approach to cases that may
ultimately involve pure state contract law disputes.107 As Justice
Stevens inquired with respect to the Telecom Act, “[If] [t]he only
question is, do they have to pay on Tuesday instead of Thursday, and
that’s governed by some State common law rule . . . . That, you
would agree, could not be litigated in Federal court?”108 The
Assistant to the Solicitor General was unable to answer. In Shoshone
Mining Co. v. Rutter,109 the Court reasoned that “Inasmuch . . . as
the ‘adverse suit’ to determine the right of possession may not
involve any question as to the construction or effect of the
Constitution or laws of the United States, but may present simply a
question of fact as to . . . the effect of state statutes, it would seem to
follow that it is not one which necessarily arises under the
Constitution and laws of the United States.”110
Some argue that Shoshone was correctly decided because
[t]he Court was properly concerned with the volume of litigation
which a contrary decision would have loosed upon federal trial
courts . . . . The Court, for pragmatic reasons, had refused to
extend the jurisdiction to a large class of cases which would, in
most instances, involve no clearly defined federal interest and no
issue of federal law.111

Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and “The Martian Chronicles,” 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1786
(1992).
106. Id. at 1787.
107. The pejorative view of expanding federal jurisdiction is reflected in Justice Scalia’s
question, “How many of these agreements, negotiated or otherwise, are there Nation-wide? …
I’m just wondering how many pure contract cases are being dumped into Federal courts by
your [proposal].” Oral Argument at 5–6, Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub.. Serv. Comm’n of Md.,
122 S. Ct. 1753 (2002) (Nos. 00-1531, 00-1711).
108. Oral Argument at 32, Mathias v. WorldCom Techs., Inc., opinion forthcoming
(Dec. 5, 2001) (No. 00-878).
109. 177 U.S. 505 (1900).
110. Id. at 509.
111. William Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement that a Case Arise “Directly”
Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890, 903 (1967); see also Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal
“Question” in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157 (1953). But see DAVID P. CURRIE,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN A NUTSHELL 74 (4th ed. 1999) (“Since both the right and the
remedy were created by federal law, the fact that certain matters were to be decided as state law
would decide them does not seem to indicate a lack of federal interest in the case, any more

739

REED-FIN

9/30/2002 9:33 AM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[2002

The policy of judicial economy suggests that if a particular
construction of the statute will dump thousands of cases into the
federal courts and overburden the system, it should be construed so
as to limit jurisdiction. But this argument seems based only on
pragmatism and not legitimate jurisdictional limitations or sound
jurisprudential theory. Congress has the power to create and limit
jurisdiction of federal courts. If it intended federal courts to have
jurisdiction, it does not seem proper to allow the judiciary to deny
such a conferral of jurisdiction. While intuitively appealing, this
limiting factor results in a breakdown of the separation of powers
between the judiciary and Congress.
4. Rooker-Feldman as a limit on federal question jurisdiction:
Abstention and state quasi-judicial body decisions
Federalism, the principle by which both the federal and state
governments’ sovereignty is protected, comes full circle in the
Fourth Circuit’s extension of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that parties may not appeal
adverse state court judgments to a federal district court; Federal
questions in such decisions must be appealed directly to the Supreme
Court. The Fourth Circuit argued, “[I]t would violate basic tenets of
federalism to conclude, in the absence of specific federal
authorization, that a federal court may review a State quasi-judicial
body.”112 The Court then noted that “[w]hile strict application of
the doctrine requires a final judgment from State courts, the federal
intrusion into State affairs is not any less when the judgment issues
from a State quasi judicial body.”113
Both state and federal administrative agencies at times act in a
judicial capacity. In Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co.,114 the Court
explained that administrative agencies (in this instance, the Virginia
State Corporation Commission) at times act judicially:
A judicial inquiry investigates, declares, and enforces liabilities as
they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already
to exist. . . . Legislation, on the other hand, looks to the future and

than a state would be without concern as to the operation of its own courts merely because it
had incorporated the federal rules.”).
112. Bell Atl. Md., Inc. v. MCI WorldCom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279, 308 (4th Cir. 2001).
113. Id.
114. 211 U.S. 210 (1908).
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changes existing conditions by making a new rule, to be applied
thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its power.115

The critical factor is not the character of the body but rather the
character of the proceedings.116 In the telecommunications context,
state regulatory commissions closely resemble a court when
interpreting interconnection agreements. The commissions subpoena
witnesses and documents, administer oaths, and exercise power to
hold parties in contempt of the proceedings. Parties commence the
actions, conduct discovery, and take part in a trial.117
Nevertheless, while the Fourth Circuit’s attenuated argument
regarding this form of abstention does relate to federalism concerns,
the lower court did not give any compelling reason why the doctrine
should be extended beyond its current construct: Rooker-Feldman is
an abstention doctrine that does not extend to decisions of state
commissions. In City of Chicago v. International College of
Surgeons,118 the Court found that federal courts do have the
prerogative to review state administrative action, even if a state-law
appellate procedure exists. There the Court found that suits to
obtain “judicial review of state administrative decisions” are
“generally encompasse[d]” within federal subject matter
jurisdiction.119 Undoubtedly, where a state court renders a final
judgment, the appellate procedure should be through 28 U.S.C. §
1257(a). But where, as here, there is no final judgment by the state,
district court review of the matter is proper.

115. Id. at 226.
116. D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 477 (1983). The Supreme Court
has recognized that both the states and the federal government have the power to transfer
certain adjudicatory functions to administrative agencies so long as there is the availability of
subsequent judicial review. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 929 n.14 (1997) (citing
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932)).
117. See Brief for Respondent, Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 122 S.
Ct. 1753 (2002) (Nos. 00-1531, 00-1711). These functions are similar to those exercised in
Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627 (1986),
where the Court found that the state civil rights commission’s proceedings were “judicial” in
nature.
At oral argument for the companion case Mathias, the Court indicated that this will
likely have implications for any future Ex parte Young determination. The Court alludes that if
an administrative body is acting in a judicial capacity rather than in an executive or legislative
capacity, Ex parte Young may have no applicability. Oral Argument at 49–50, Mathias v.
WorldCom Techs., Inc., opinion forthcoming (Dec. 5, 2001) (No. 00-878).
118. 522 U.S. 156 (1997).
119. Id. at 169.
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V. CONCLUSION
As the spirit of cooperative federalism continues in Congress and
the spirit of the Tenth Amendment continues in the Court, both
institutions must be aware of and vigilantly guard federal
accountability. The danger of forgetting the importance of federal
accountability is that few would notice or would be outraged by this
erosion of accountability. This likely apathy would result because the
decisions would be made on technical issues such as “jurisdiction”
rather than on the more politically volatile issues such as invoking
Eleventh Amendment immunity and exempting state officials from
injunctive relief under the Ex parte Young doctrine. Yet federal
uniformity and accountability has been an important goal since the
first decisions of the Supreme Court. As Justice Story described:
Judges of equal learning and integrity, in different states, might
differently interpret a statute, or a treaty of the United States, or
even the constitution itself: If there were no revising authority to
control these jarring and discordant judgments, and harmonize
them into uniformity, the laws, the treaties, and the constitution of
the United States would be different in different states, and might,
perhaps, never have precisely the same construction, obligation, or
efficacy, in any two states. The public mischiefs that would attend
such a state of things would be truly deplorable.120

Cooperative federalist programs like the Telecom Act necessarily
result in state-to-state variance and innovation. But some minimal
federal oversight is critical to the spirit of cooperation. Limiting
federal jurisdiction has far-reaching consequences on the
accountability of the states and state programs. In the 105th
Congress alone, more than thirty-one bills or resolutions were
proposed with serious federalism considerations.121 Programs ranging
from environmental regulation122 to insurance regulation123 are being
handed over to the states while ostensibly imposing federal

120. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 348 (1816).
121. Keith Bea & Eugene Boyd, Federalism Legislation in the 105th Congress: A
Descriptive Overview, CRS ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS (Sept. 11, 1998).
122. See John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L.
REV. 1183, 1197–98 (1995).
123. See Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism
and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 694–98
(1999).
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standards.124 Although these innovative programs are made in the
spirit of cooperation, when combined with the judiciary’s new
federalist approach to self-jurisdiction stripping, the result is a
program with little to no federal accountability and little federal
uniformity.125 Professor Martin Redish observed the limitations of
this “astrological” approach to subject matter jurisdiction:
Any system that aims for the highest levels of fairness and efficiency
must make hard choices. Random or irrational distinctions
premised on no ground other than the fact that they reduce
caseloads effectively skew that decisionmaking process by obscuring
the comparative cost-benefit analysis. Our values and traditions of
federalism demand a more careful and rational weighing process
than much of our existing jurisdictional structure evinces.126

The costs of denying federal jurisdiction in the 1996
Telecommunications Act and other similar cooperative federalist
programs would be high. The benefit of increased state sovereignty,
while a reasonable end, should not be bought at the price of fairness,
efficiency, and, ultimately, federal uniformity.
Michelle Reed

124. See generally Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative
Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663 (2001). Congress has passed many other cooperative
federalism arrangements. See, e.g., Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (1994);
Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j-26 (1994); Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
1396–1396v (1994); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k
(1994); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (1994).
125. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 41, at 488 (“The purpose of federal
question jurisdiction is to promote uniformity in the application of federal law.
Misunderstanding of federal law is as grave a threat to uniformity as is hostility toward that law,
and it is a far more likely threat.”).
126. Redish, supra note 105, at 1831–32.
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